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Abstract
Linked Data provides some sensible guidelines for publishing and consuming data on
the Web. Data published on the Web has no inherent truth, yet its quality can often be
assessed based on its provenance. This work introduces a new approach to provenance
for Linked Data. The simplest notion of provenance – viz., a named graph indicating
where the data is now – is extended with a richer provenance format. The format
reﬂects the behaviour of processes interacting with Linked Data, tracing where the data
has been published and who published it. An executable model is presented based on
abstract syntax and operational semantics, providing a proof of concept and the means
to statically evaluate provenance driven access control using a type system.
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1. Introduction
The Web challenges traditional perspectives on data. Traditionally, data is stored
in centralised databases with clear ownership. Only trusted experts have access to
the mechanisms for manipulating data and the boundaries of each data set are ﬁxed.
Linked Data shatters these assumptions, by removing the boundaries between datasets
and reducing barriers for publishing data.
Linked Data is a movement which is pushing data onto the Web [5]. To reﬂect
the diversity of data a light data format is introduced. The data format is based on
triples of Uniform Resource Identiﬁers (URIs). Triples of URIs are versatile. A wide
variety of data sources can be lifted to collections of triples. Furthermore, the use of
URIs as standardised global identiﬁers allows data from one source to refer to data
in another source. Several protocols are then employed to consume and publish data
collaboratively. With many contributors and locations, tracking the provenance of data
becomes a signiﬁcant challenge.
In the Web of Linked Data, anyone can form a triple. If someone makes a statement
and publishes it as a triple on the Web, it does not mean that the triple can be trusted.
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individuals involved in producing the triple and the judgement of the consumer of the
triple. Thus this work argues that a consumer of Linked Data is most concerned with
the provenance of triples. The provenance of any values inside triples is secondary.
For Linked Data the big concern is the provenance of a statement such as “Yoshihito
Toyama is aliated with Tohoku University,” rather than the provenance of identiﬁer
for Tohoku University.
The problem of provenance tracking for Linked Data is well known. A basic prove-
nance mechanism called a named graph is widely supported [10, 45]. A named graph
extends triples with an extra location which indicates where the triple is located. This
is the simplest kind of where provenance. From a triple in a named graph, decisions
can be made based on where the triple is located now. A query may speciﬁcally ask for
triples lifted from the BBC News feed for Asia.
A named graph only captures ‘where now’ provenance. Harth Polleres and Decker
argue that a more social provenance model is required [25]. By a social provenance
model, they mean that the context should record who provenance. The ‘where now’
provenance of named graphs can be extended with ‘who now’ provenance, by also
identifying the agent who published the data. This work captures such social prove-
nance, by extending the notion of a named graph with pairs.
This work extends named graphs one step further, by tracing provenance history.
The protocols for Linked Data allow triples to be retrieved from locations and written
to other locations [44]. Thus a history of ‘where and who’ provenance can be accu-
mulated. Each time an agent publishes data in a location, the agent and location can
be recorded in the provenance history of the triple. Furthermore, the data may be pro-
cessed locally, by the agent. Recording the operations which were applied to the data
provides a notion of ‘how’ provenance.
This work provides a calculus of processes which use, consume and publish Linked
Data tracing data provenances. The calculus demonstrates that the proposed prove-
nance format tracks the provenance of data according to the processes modelled. It
allows the claim that the provenance format introduced is suitable for Linked Data to
be evaluated.
The calculus goes one step further, by exploiting the provenance format to enhance
Linked Data protocols. The model introduces a logic for provenance patterns. The
logic can be used to specify precise queries over Linked Data. The calculus is then
typed to ensure that an access control policy based on the provenance format can be
maintained. A type system ensures the integrity of the policy of each location. Such
policies can improve the reliability of Linked Data. A ﬁrst key result is a subject
reduction theorem, which veriﬁes that such policies can be guaranteed by the static
analysis of processes. Further formal results prove that the policies described are in-
deed captured by the model. The implication is that this static analysis can be applied
to programs which follow the Linked Data protocols modelled.
The present paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces provenance and
Linked Data. The syntax and the operational semantics of the calculus are the contents
of Section 3 and of Section 4, respectively. Section 5 introduces a type system whose
properties are shown in Section 6. Related work is discussed in Section 7 and some
conclusions are drawn in Section 8. The electronic version of this paper contains the
2URIs mentioned as active links.
2. Linked Data: Guiding Principles and Provenance
Some ubiquitous Web standards are employed to support Linked Data. These stan-
dards enable the decentralised identiﬁcation of resources, the transfer of data, the rep-
resentation of data and the exploitation of data. These technologies are brieﬂy sum-
marised, and an overview of how these technologies meet the guidelines for Linked
Data is provided.
URIs are identiﬁers for resources on the Web. A URI may be used in the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to supports the fundamental operations for publishing and
consuming data at that URI. URIs may also be used in the Resource Description Fram-
work (RDF), to identify resources in data. RDF is a standardised loosely structured
data format which allows the resources identiﬁed by URIs to be described by their re-
lationship to other URIs. Finally, the SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language,
standardise some basic mechanisms for exploiting RDF.
The guiding principles of Linked Data were outlined by Berners-Lee [3]. Firstly,
in data use URIs to name things; as opposed to a local identiﬁer scheme speciﬁc to a
dataset. Secondly, make use of the HTTP protocol, so that the URIs can be looked up.
This process of looking up a URI using HTTP, called dereferencing, should provide
useful information using standards, speciﬁcally RDF and SPARQL. Finally, include
other dereferenceable URIs in the dereferenced data, so that more things can be dis-
covered. The idea is that distributed data published following these guidelines can be
used collectively, without prior coordination.
Information about the publications of Yoshihito Toyama is readily available as
Linked Data. There is of course a URI for the home page of Toyama at Tohoku Uni-
versity. However, the Web page does not return Linked Data, so is not dereferenceable.
Fortunately, there are many dereferenceable URIs for Toyama. One such URI can be
dereferenced to obtain the following data.
subject property object
Toyama akt:type akt:Person
rkpres:CS132820 akt:has-author Toyama
The above data is in the standard format of RDF triples. Furthermore the data
contains dereferenceable URIs. Thus the URI for the paper, rkpres:CS132820, can be
dereferenced to obtain some more information. The data returned includes the follow-
ing data.
subject property object
rkpres:CS132820 akt:has-author Toyama
rkpres:CS132820 cites rkpres:CS323375
Notice that these triples have a dierent provenance, the ﬁrst two triples came from
dereferencingaURIforToyama, thesecondtwotriplescamefromdereferencingaURI
for one of his papers. Indeed the same triple appeared twice with dierent provenances.
The source of these triples can be traced further. Three of these triples originated
from a data source published at URI source1. This source can be traced back to a data
dump made by the website CiteSeer. Thus the origin of the last two triples above might
3be traced as the following sequence of two URIs followed by an operation Lift, which
transforms some raw data into RDF. The left most location is the most recent.
rkpres:CS132820  source1  Lift#
Furthermore, we can trace the agents who wrote this data. In this case, an agent acting
on behalf of CiteSeer lifted the data and published the data as RDF. Another agent
RKBexplorer owned the process which republished part of this information for the
above paper. Thus the agents can be included in the provenance trace. Notice that the
agent which wrote the data and the location where the data was published form a pair.
(RKBexplorer;rkpres:CS132820)  (CiteSeer; source1)  Lift#
There are several operations involved in the scenario in this section. There is the pro-
cess own by agent CiteSeer, which obtained the data and published it in a location.
There is the process owned by RKBexplorer, which obtained data from several loca-
tions, including the dump above. The data was then ﬁltered for information about a
URI and the resulting data was published at the URI, so that the URI could be deref-
erenced. This work introduces a calculus which captures the behaviour of processes in
this scenario whilst automatically tracking the provenance of triples.
Noticethatincludingtheentiretraceisstrongerthantheapproachoeredbynamed
graphs [10]. A named graph just provides a current location for a triple, it cannot
track the provenance history. With the extended provenance format we can determine
whether a triple originated with the ACM, CiteSeer or DBLP as well as the current lo-
cation. This is useful since these are trustworthy sources for data on academic publica-
tions. We may also only trust data which was most recently handled by RKBexplorer,
since RKBexplorer is a reliable agent for gathering Linked Data. These, and many
more, provenance patterns can be handled by this work.
The language suggested by this work is a high level language, where interaction
with provenance is primitive. At times, several low level operations are covered by
a single high level operation. However, there should be no doubt that the language
encompasses the guidelines for publishing Linked Data. The provenance format is
a serious contribution to the area of Linked Data, extending existing approaches for
tracing the provenance of triples.
3. A Syntax for Capturing Provenance in Linked Data
The methods employed here are purely syntactic. This section introduces the ba-
sic atoms and grammars required to discuss both a provenance format and systems in
which the provenance represented can be traced.
3.1. The Syntax for a Format for Provenance Traces
The basis of the provenance format are identiﬁers representing where and who.
Both identiﬁers are readily provided by the Linked Data architecture. Using these
identiﬁers a provenance format is proposed which is evaluated throughout this work
for its eectiveness in tracking the provenance of triples.
4agents: ; functions: f;g
locations: `;m location variable: a;b
location or variable:  F ` j a
provenances:
p F  empty
j (;`) who-where
j f# why
j p  p concatenation
j p _ p disjunction
 F  j  F f j  F  j
patterns:
 F  empty
j (;) who-where
j # why
j    concatenation
j  _  disjunction
j  Kleene star
j > top
Figure 1: The provenance format and pattern syntax.
Identiﬁers for where, who and why. This work refers to URIs as locations, ranged
over by `;m in deﬁnitions. Toyama denotes one of several dereferenceable URIs for
Yoshihito Toyama.
Entities which run processes, are referred to as agents. It is assumed here that each
agent has an identiﬁer, ranged over by ;, which identify ‘who.’ Harth et. al. note that
the Web has a built in mechanism for identifying agents via the Domain Name System
(DNS) [25]. There are obvious issues with using DNS to identify agents, particularly
since the correspondence between DNS identiﬁers and agents is not necessarily one-
to-one. The exact choice of identiﬁer is perpendicular to this work.
This work assumes that there are some basic functions which can be applied to
data, ranged over by f;g. These functions can be recorded in the provenance format
where they appear as the function names followed by #. There are various mechanisms
these functions could represent, so the details are not provided in this work. The point
is that some basic ‘why’ provenance can be recorded.
Theprovenanceformat. Figure1introducestheprovenanceformat, whichtraces‘who’
and ‘where’ provenance with some basic ‘why’ provenance information. A who-where
provenance pair indicates that a particular agent published data in a particular location.
That data may be retrieved and published in another location by another agent. Each
time the trace is extended. Disjunction can be used in provenances to represent that the
data from several sources have been combined. Why they where combined may also
be indicated.
The following trace represents that initially there were two pieces of data. One
piece of data was published by agent ACM in acm 1 another piece was published by
agent CiteSeer in cs 1: Agent RKBExplorer consumes both pieces of data, applies the
function Clean to the combination of both pieces of data, and publishes it in location
Toyama.
(RKBExplorer;Toyama)  Clean#  ((ACM;acm 1)  Lift# _ (DBLP;cs 1)  Lift#)
The pattern language. Figure 1 introduces the syntax of patterns. The basic atoms of
the patterns are who-where pairs and functions extended with wild cards. The wild
5data variable: x;y
expressions:
e F x variable
j D data
j f(e) application
j e jj e composition
stored data:
D F (```)p tracked triple
j D jj D composition
j 0 empty data
queries:
Q F () triple pattern
j Q  Q choose
j Q 
 Q tensor
j 9a:Q exists
j Q iteration
Figure 2: The syntax stored data queries and expressions.
cards state that any agent, location or function can be matched. The pattern language
for provenances is based on Kleene algebras. The operations of a Kleene algebra allow
concatenation, and disjunction of patterns as well as a Kleene star, which allows a
pattern to be matched an arbitrary number of times. There is also a top element which
can match any pattern.
The following examples are useful patterns which can be expressed. Using iteration
and disjunction, the pattern ((Glaser; ) _ (Millard; )) guarantees that only agents
Glaser or Millard ever wrote this data. The pattern >  ( ;acm 1) states that data
originated from the ACM periodical data. The pattern >  (L3C; )  ( ;Toyama)  >
states that at some point data published in location Toyama was republished by agent
L3C (L3C, Glaser and Millard published the real data referred to in examples).
3.2. Mechanisms for Manipulating Linked Data
This section introduces the standard data format for Linked Data, extended with
the provenance from the previous section. Query mechanism for picking out patterns
in Linked Data are extended with provenance patterns, so that provenances can be
exploited in queries. Finally, expressions which manipulate data are suggested. See
Fig. 2.
Annotating triples with provenance. RDF is based on triples of URIs, which resemble
simple sentences in natural language. The ﬁrst component is the subject, the second
the property and the third the object. There are some further features of RDF including
literal values and blank nodes [27], however this work focuses only on URIs.
Forstoreddatathesyntaxoftriplesisdecoratedwithaprovenance. Theprovenance
represents the history of where, who and why the triple was obtained. Furthermore, the
most recent provenance indicates where the triple is now. An example is:
(ipl:Toyama87dc:creatorToyama)(L3S;dipl:Toyama87)(DBLP;source4)
6Annotating queries with patterns. The standard for querying RDF is SPARQL. A for-
malsyntacticmodelforSPARQLquerieshasbeenprovided[29]. Forbrevity, thiswork
takes the most relevant subset of SPARQL and adapts it to this setting, represented as
the queries in Fig. 2. The constructs form a commutative Kleene algebra with existen-
tial quantiﬁers over triples annotated with provenance patterns. The disjunction gives a
choice of queries, the tensor allows more than one triple to be identiﬁed, the existential
quantiﬁers allow locations to be discovered. The Kleene star allows many instances of
a triple to be matched.
Queries are used in this setting to test whether some data matches a pattern. This is
used in the calculus to consume data which matches only that pattern. The following
query demands that two triples are discovered. The subject of both triples must be the
sameURI. Furthermore, the provenancepatterns ensuresthat thetriples wereoriginally
posted by an agent on behalf of the ACM.
9a:

(adc:creatorToyama)>(ACM; ) 
 (a journal ipl)>(ACM; )
Expression over data. To allow data to be manipulated functions mapping stored data
to stored data are introduced. The functions are used in the syntax of expressions to
representthemanipulationofdata. Futureworkwouldintroduceacalculusoffunctions
to precisely specify the transformation performed, facilitating a more detailed analysis
of why provenance.
3.3. A Syntax for Process Conﬁgurations
This section introduces processes which manipulate data. Systems then model a
combination of data decorated by provenances and processes run by particular agents.
Firstly, policies for URIs must be explained since they appear in processes. Policies
control the access of an agent to a location based on the provenance of data.
The syntax of policies. According to the syntax of systems, Fig. 3, agents interact
with data by means of three operations: getting, deleting and inserting. Therefore it is
sensible to design location policies prescribing which agents can read and modify their
data.
For example the location dipl:Toyama87 can allow anybody to get the data inserted
by Glaser and originally posted by an agent representing the ACM. This can be repre-
sented by the access triple:
h ;Glaser;>  (ACM; )i
The same location can allow Millard to delete only data inserted by himself and at
some point published at location acm 1, while Glaser can delete arbitrary data. This is
represented by the following access triple:
fhMillard;Millard;>  ( ;acm 1)  >i;hGlaser; ;>ig
Lastly onlyMillardandGlasercan insertdata inthe locationdipl:Toyama87, andwhile
Millard must take the data from DBLP, Glaser can take data from any source. This is
expressed by the set of insert pairs:
fhMillard;( ;DBLP)  >i;hGlaser;>ig
7process variable: X
policy of locations: Loc(R;D;I)
processes:
P F 0 termination
j get(Q; x):P consume
j del(Q; x):P delete
j ins(;e):P publish
j P + P choose
j 9a: Loc(R;D;I):P select location
j X process variable
j recX:P recursion
access triples:  F h;;i
insert pairs:  F h;i
sets of access triples: R;D
sets of insert pairs: I
systems:
S F 0 termination
j D stored data
j [P] agent
j S jj S parallel
Figure 3: The syntax of processes and systems.
These examples justify that the location policies are built from three sets (see Fig. 3):
1. the set R of access triples which controls get access to data;
2. the set D of access triples which controls delete access to data;
3. the set I of insert pairs which prescribes the data insertion policy.
The syntax of processes. Processes suggest a high level programming language which
combines HTTP operations with queries and expressions. This allows sequences of
interactions with Linked Data, including dereferencing, to be expressed. The syntax of
processes is deﬁned in Fig. 3.
There are three operators for interacting with Linked Data – get, delete and insert.
These operations model both HTTP operations and query mechanisms [44]. Get re-
trieves some data, but also restricts the data using a query pattern. The resulting data is
then passed on to a continuation process, since the data variable binds occurrences in
the continuation process.
Since queries include provenance patterns, the provenance of the data retrieved
is also selected. This allows the most basic dereference operation to be realised, as
shown below. Notice that a dereferenceable URI for Toyama appears in the provenance
pattern, indicating the location to dereference. The query pattern asks for anything, so
all data in that location can be retrieved.
get

9a:9b:9c:(abc)( ;Toyama)> ; x

:Display Data(x)
The data variable binds occurrences in the continuation process. It is assumed that the
process Display Data does something useful with the data retrieved. Several examples
of get with more precise queries are provided throughout this work.
Delete has the same form as get. The only dierence is the data retrieved which
matches the query is removed, whereas get persists the data. Insert consists of an
8expression, a location and a continuation process. Insert is used to publish the data
which results from evaluating the expression at the location, before continuing.
The other operations are used to control the ﬂow of processes. The choice operator
allows one of two processes to be selected. The existential operator binds a location
variable. When a location variable in a query is bound, the location discovered is uni-
ﬁed with the continuation. This allows locations to be passed from data to continuation
process. Notice that the bound location variable is annotated with a location policy.
This is necessary to guarantee that the variable is replaced by a location of that policy.
The process variable and ﬁxed point operator allow a process to behave recursively.
Finally, there is a process representing termination.
The syntax of systems. The state of systems is expressed using the syntax in Fig. 3.
Systems indicate the agent which runs a process. This information is required for
tracing who provenance. The processes of several agents can be composed in parallel
with stored data. Two examples of processes which refer to the agent which runs them
are provided.
Suppose that an agent L3S has made some contribution to data located at l3s pub .
The following pattern removes all data this agent has created. Both data that was
written directly to the location by the agent, and data in the location which was touched
by the agent at some point in the past is removed.
L3S
h
del

9a:9b:9c:(abc)(L3S;l3s pub)>_(( ;l3s pub)>(L3S; )>) ; x

:0
i
Suppose that an agent  periodically moves information from one location to an-
other location (the origin location acm 1 and the target location l3s pub ). The agent
obtains citations from the source location. The agent then removes citations with a
provenance which indicates that the agent himself had obtained them from the source
location and inserted them in the target location. Finally, the agent inserts new triples
in place of the triples removed.

2
6 6 6 6 6 4recX:
0
B B B B B @
get

9a:9b:(acitesb)( ;acm 1)> ; x

:
del

9a:9b:(acitesb)(;l3s pub)( ;acm 1)> ;y

:ins(l3s pub; x):X
1
C C C C C A
3
7 7 7 7 7 5
Notice that the triples inserted will have the same provenance as the triples removed in
the previous step. This means that on the next iteration of the recursion, these triples
will be removed and replaced by more up to date triples. The eect is that  maintains
a copy of citation data from the source location at the target location.
The next section deﬁnes the behaviour of the above systems precisely.
4. An Operational Semantics for Provenance Tracking in Linked Data
Operational semantics captures the behaviours of the systems modelled by the syn-
tax of the previous section. The behaviour of systems depends on the evaluation of
provenance patterns, queries and expressions, which are formalised using deductive
systems. Given the mechanisms deﬁned in this section, substantial examples which
track provenance in Linked Data can be executed.
9dtop agente
 
dtop locatione
 
dtop functione
f#  #
dtop processe
  >
dreﬂexivitye
  
dweakeninge
  
  0   0
dpaire
(;)  (0;0)
0  0
0 1  0
1 dconcate
0  1  0
0  0
1
0  1 1  2
dtranse
0  2
0  1
dR0 _e
0  1 _ 2
0  2
dR1 _e
0  1 _ 2
0  2 1  2
dL _e
0 _ 1  2
0  1  
1 dexpande
0  
1
0 _ (1  2)  2
dﬁxe
0  
1  2
p  
dsate
p  
Figure 4: The pre-order on patterns and satisfaction relation for provenances.
4.1. Satisfaction of patterns
Figure 4 deﬁnes a pre-order over patterns. Provenances are a restriction of the
syntax of patterns. Thus the pre-order relation for patterns is used to deﬁne satisfaction
of provenances. The deﬁnition of satisfaction p   is similar to the deﬁnition in [51].
Further to the rules assume that (;;) forms a monoid. The monoid provides the
structural rules which can be applied at any point in a deduction. Axioms ensure that
wild cards dominate locations, agents and functions. This ordering is extended point-
wise to pairs. The rules for concatenation, disjunction and the Kleene star are standard.
The rules weakening, expand and ﬁx are adapted from the (left) Kleene algebras [36].
The following proposition, which states the meaning of the pre-order on patterns,
can be easily shown by the deﬁnition of pattern satisfaction and pre-order.
Proposition 4.1.   0 if and only if p   implies p  0. In particular p   if and
only if p  .
4.2. Satisfaction of queries
Figure 5 presents a deductive system for deciding whether some data satisﬁes a
query. The deﬁnition adapts the most relevant subset of the model of a SPARQL Query
presented in [29].
The axioms for queries hold when a stored triple, matches a triple demanded by
the query. Triples are denoted by C. The stored triple is annotated with a provenance,
while the query triple is annotated with a pattern. The axiom is therefore dependent on
the provenance matching the pattern, as deﬁned in the previous section.
The further constructs for queries allow expressive patterns over data. The tensor
rule acts like the join in relational algebra, which ensures that both parts of a query are
simultaneously answered. The rules for choose and exists provide more ﬂexibility in
10p  
dQAxe
Cp j= C
D j= Q0
dQChLe
D j= Q0  Q1
D j= Q1
dQChRe
D j= Q0  Q1
D0 j= Q0 D1 j= Q1
dQTe
D0 jj D1 j= Q0 
 Q1
D j= Qf`= ag
dQEe
D j= 9a:Q
dQWe
j= Q
D j= Q
dQDe
D j= Q
D j= Q 
 Q
dQCe
D j= Q
Figure 5: Satisfaction of queries
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Figure 6: A big step operational semantics for expressions.
queries by selecting one of several ways in which a query can be evaluated. Iterations
employs weakening, dereliction and contraction to enable a pattern to be answered an
unbounded number of times.
4.3. Expression evaluation
A big step operational semantics is provided for expressions, though the relation +
deﬁned in Fig. 6. Functions are recorded in the provenance of triples only when they
aected the triples.
Raw stored data is simply stored data without the provenance annotation. The
functions from stored data to stored data are deﬁned with respect to their underlying
functions from raw stored data to raw stored data. More precisely assume that for each
function functions f there is a corresponding raw function jfj from raw stored data to
raw stored data. The raw function may be undeﬁned if some of the triples in the data
are unused. The notation # is used for the evaluation of raw functions.
For more accurate why and how provenance the nature of these functions over
data need to be more precisely deﬁned. It would be possible to base the functions
on the calculus of SPARQL Updates [31]. Each update is associated with a proof
which explains why an update holds. The proofs should however be considered up to
equivalence, which greatly increases the cost of evaluating provenance patterns.
AmodelofhowprovenanceforupdatesindatabasesisprovidedbyGreenet.al.[22].
Green et. al. employ a provenance structure which accounts for the data deleted and the
data inserted by updates. Similar provenance structures could be considered here.
114.4. Policies
The pre-orders on agents, locations and patterns (see Fig. 4) naturally induces the
component-wise pre-order on access triples and insert pairs. We can then also compare
location policies: a smaller policy must allow all what is allowed by a bigger policy.
In this way each location can get all policies which are bigger than its own. This can
be achieved by asking that all triples and pairs in the bigger policy have corresponding
bigger triples and pairs in the smaller policy. This leads to the deﬁnition:
Loc(R0;D0;I0)  Loc(R;D;I) if
8 2 R 90 2 R0 :   0 and 8 2 D 90 2 D0 :   0 and 8 2 I 90 2 I0 :   0
where  ranges over access triple and  access over insert pairs. For example the policy
Loc(fh ;Glaser;>ig;fh ; ;>( ;acm 1)>ig;fh ;>ig) is smaller than dipl:Toyama87
policy(seepage7). ThebottompolicyisLoc(fh ; ;>ig;fh ; ;>ig;fh ;>ig)andthere
is no top policy.
4.5. Reduction Rules for Systems
The reduction rules for systems are presented in Fig. 7. This completes the deﬁni-
tion of the operational semantics, hence more substantial examples are provided.
Get and delete and insert. The get rule and delete rule are similar. Both rules match
some data which occur in parallel with the process containing the query pattern. The
resulting data is substituted in the continuation process. The dierence between the two
is that for get the data in the context persists, whereas for delete the data is consumed.
The insert rule evaluates an expression to obtain some data. The data is then in-
serted in the location indicated. This is done by placing the data in parallel with the
process and updating the provenance to indicate that most recently the data was written
to the location by the given agent.
The following scenario demonstrates the execution of get, delete and insert op-
erators. Suppose that two agents identiﬁed by Sassone and Horne contribute triples
about Toyama. In the system conﬁguration below Sassone has already contributed a
triple and Horne is ready to contribute some misleading information. The misleading
information is about a city classiﬁed as a Core City in Japan, also called Toyama. Mis-
taken identity of resources with similar properties is a well known problem for Linked
Data [18].
(Toyamaakt:has-aliationTohoku University)(Sassone;Toyama) jj
Horne

ins(Toyama;(Toyama Cityakt:typeCore city)):0

Consider a third agent identiﬁed by Dezani. This agent trusts contributions made
by Sassone about Toyama, but notices that Horne has made a mistake. Using a prove-
nance pattern the agent Dezani can remove the work of Horne, without aecting the
contribution of Sassone and other agents. Furthermore, the contribution removed is
reposted in the correct location.
Dezani
h
del

9a:9b:9c:(abc)(Horne;Toyama)> ; x

:ins(Toyama City; x):0
i
12After three steps, the following data are obtained:
(Toyamaakt:has-aliationTohoku University)(Sassone;Toyama) jj
(Toyama Cityakt:typeCore city)(Dezani;Toyama City)(Horne;Toyama)
Notice that the correctly contributed triple has not been touched. The provenance of
the new triple records the agents who aected its current and prior locations.
Passing locations to continuations. Notice that the target location of insert can be a
variable. This allows a name discovered by a query to be used. This eect is achieved
by using existential quantiﬁers at the level of processes. The rule substitutes a location
in place of the variable such that the process can perform a transition. The rule also
checks whether the substituted location has a suitable policy, though the function T
which associates policies to locations.
The following example demonstrates an existential quantiﬁer which binds a loca-
tion variable in a query and an insert. Assume that Loc0 is some policy with the insert
pair h;>  (ACM; )i, which allows  to insert triples originating with the ACM.

h
9a: Loc0:

del

(aakt:has-authorToyama)( ;Toyama)> ; x

:ins(a; x):0
i
jj
(rkpres:CS132820akt:has-authorToyama)(Glaser;Toyama)(ACM;acm 1)
Assuming that the location rkpres:CS132820 has the policy Loc0, this location is sub-
stituted to a when evaluating the delete. So the the system evolves to the following
state.

"
ins
 
rkpres:CS132820;
(rkpres:CS132820akt:has-authorToyama)(Glaser;Toyama)(ACM;acm 1)
!
:0
#
The reduction of the insert command gives the following data:
(rkpres:CS132820akt:has-authorToyama)(;rkpres:CS132820)(Glaser;Toyama)(ACM;acm 1)
An example of exists binding pattern in continuations is presented in the next section.
4.6. Dereferencing Revisited
This section returns to the scenario initially described in Section 2. The data and
processes deﬁned realise the scenario. This demonstrates the power of the calculus for
precisely modelling and evaluating Linked Data.
Consider how the data was published. Initially some agent CiteSeer lifts the data
from some source. The lifted data is then published at cs 1 . This results in the follow-
ing stored data, along with a huge amount of similarly annotated data.
(Toyamaakt:typeakt:Person)(CiteSeer;cs 1)Lift# jj
(rkpres:CS132820akt:has-authorToyama)(CiteSeer;source1)Lift#
Now some agent RKBexplorer dereferences the data and extracts the data which im-
mediately refers to Toyama. The agent is also allowed to draw from another source
acm 1 , which for now is empty. The agent them publishes the combination of any
13S 0  ! S 1
dcontexte
S 0 jj S 2  ! S 1 jj S 2
D j= Q
dgete
[get(Q; x):P] jj D  ! 
h
PfD=xg
i
jj D
D jj 
h
PfrecX:P= Xg
i
 ! S
drece
D jj [recX:P]  ! S
e + m
i=1C
pi
i dinse
[ins(`;e):P]  ! [P] jj m
i=1C
(;`)pi
i
D j= Q
ddele
[del(Q; x):P] jj D  ! 
h
PfD=xg
i
D jj [P1]  ! S
dchoosee
D jj [P1 + P2]  ! S
D jj 
h
Pf`= ag
i
 ! S T(`)  Loc(R;D;I)
dselecte
D jj [9a: Loc(R;D;I):P]  ! S
Figure 7: Reduction rules for systems
data from both sources in the location Toyama . An agent which achieves this is pre-
sented below.
RKBexplorer
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
get

9a;b:

(Toyamaab)( ;cs 1)>  (abToyama)( ;cs 1)>
; x

:
get

9a;b:

(Toyamaab)( ;acm 1)>  (abToyama)( ;acm 1)>
;y

:
ins(Toyama; x jj y):0
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
Reducing the parallel composition of the above data and agent gives the following data:
(Toyamaakt:typeakt:Person)(RKBexplorer;Toyama)(CiteSeer;cs 1)Lift# jj
(rkpres:CS132820akt:has-authorToyama)(RKBexplorer;Toyama)(CiteSeer;source1)Lift#
Note that the original data is retained, so it now appears in two locations.
ConsideranagentSassonewhoconsumesthisdata. Theagentdereferences Toyama
to discover one publication. The location of the publication is passed to the continua-
tion process. The continuation dereferences the publication to ﬁnd a paper cited by the
original paper. The location of the cited paper is then passed to the continuation. The
continuation process then dereferences the cited paper to ﬁnd whether an author of the
paper was also Toyama. The data consumed is a proof of a self-citation. The process
is expressed as follows.
Sassone
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
9a: Loc1:
0
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B @
get

(aakt:has-authorToyama)( ;Toyama)> ; x

:
9b: Loc1:
0
B B B B B B B B B B @
get

(acitesb)( ;a)> ;y

:
get

(bakt:has-authorToyama)( ;b)> ;z

:
Demonstrate Self Citation(x jj y jj z)
1
C C C C C C C C C C A
1
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C A
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
Assume that Loc1 contains the access triple hSassone; ;>i for reading, which gives
Sassone full read access. By reducing the parallel composition of the agent Sassone
14wf()
`L ` : Loc(R;D;I) (; p) 2 I wf(p)
wf((;`)  p)
wf(p)
wf(f#  p)
wf(p) wf(q)
wf(p _ q)
Figure 8: Well-Formed Provenances
bD0c
`D 0 : 
wf(p) p  
bDtc
`D Cp : 
`D D0 :  `D D1 : 
bDjjc
`D D0 jj D1 : 
Figure 9: Typing Rules for Stored Data
with some data D matching the above queries gives:
D jj Sassone

Demonstrate Self Citation(D)

Thus key processes for publishing and consuming Linked Data are captured.
5. A Type System for Provenance Based Access Control
A type system for the calculus is deﬁned. The type system guarantees that access
control policies for data are respected by processes run by agents. The access control
policies are based on the provenance of the data. More precisely the typing rules assure
that:
1. the provenances of the tracked triples agree with the location policies;
2. getting, deleting and inserting operations are always done by agents which are
authorised by the location policies, as formalised in Theorem 6.9.
For the ﬁrst point it is handy to deﬁne well-formed provenances, see Fig. 8. A
well-formed provenance is such that the provenance which follows each who-where
pair appears for the agent in the policy of the location.
A location must have all location types which are greater than or equal to the prin-
cipal type of that location. This is achieved by the following axiom:
T(`)  Loc(R;D;I)
bL`c
`L ` : Loc(R;D;I)
Since the location policies relate agents and patterns, patterns type stored data,
queries and expressions. Figure 9 gives the rules for stored data: the empty data can
have any pattern, a tracked triple with a well-formed provenance has all the patterns
satisﬁed by its provenance and composed data must have the patterns of their compo-
nents. Note that by rule bDtc each triple has many patterns, the smaller one being the
provenance itself of the triple.
Figure 10 gives the typing rules for queries, where each triple pattern has all the
provenance patterns which are bigger than or equal to its own provenance pattern.
15  0
bQtc
`Q C : 0
`Q Q : 
bQ9c
`Q 9a:Q : 
`Q Q : 
bQc
`Q Q : 
`Q Q0 :  `Q Q1 : 
bQc
`Q Q0  Q1 : 
`Q Q0 :  `Q Q1 : 
bQ
c
`Q Q0 
 Q1 : 
Figure 10: Typing Rules for Queries
bEvc
 ; x :  `E x : 
`D D : 
bEtc
  `E D : 
  `E e : 
bEfc
  `E f(e) : f#   _ 
  `E e0 :    `E e1 : 
bEjjc
  `E e0 jj e1 : 
  `E e :    0
bEsubc
  `E e : 0
Figure 11: Typing Rules for Expressions
In order to type expressions, environments (ranged over by  ) associating data vari-
ables to patterns are needed, see Fig. 11. The only interesting rule is bEfc: since in
evaluating f(D) not all the provenances of the tracked triples in D are preﬁxed by f#
(see rule bfunc in Fig. 6), only the pattern f#   _  can be deduced for f(e) knowing
that e has pattern .
For typing processes, environments (ranged over by ) associating data variables
to patterns and location variables to location types are needed. To derive for a location
all locations types which are bigger than or equal to the principal location type of that
location, a weakening of rule bL`c and a standard axiom are handy:
`L ` : Loc(R;D;I)
bL`wc
 `L ` : Loc(R;D;I)
Loc(R0;D0;I0)  Loc(R;D;I)
bLac
;a : Loc(R0;D0;I0) `L a : Loc(R;D;I)
Processes are built from get, delete and insert operations on locations. Each operation
can be allowed or disallowed by location policies according to the agent who is willing
to act. For this reason, processes are typed by agents, meaning that a process typed by
an agent contains only operations that the agent is authorised to do (see Fig. 12). In
rules bPgc and bPdc the patterns of the queries must start with a who-where pair, so
that the queries are limited to exactly one location ( can be and therefore the triples
can be inserted by an arbitrary agent). The condition h;;i 2 R assures that the
getting agrees with the location policy. Similarly for h;;i 2 D. The rule for typing
insertion simply checks that  is allowed to insert data with provence  in the location
 by the location policy.
Since systems do not contain free variables, environments to type them are not
needed, see Fig. 13. Rule bSdc validates well-typed stored data. The typing of an agent
checks that the process can be typed by the agent name, see rule bSc.
5.1. Examples of Typed Systems
The examples of systems in the previous section are revisited to consider the eect
of typing.
16; x : (;)   `P P :   `L  : Loc(R;D;I) `Q Q : (;)   h;;i 2 R
bPgc
 `P get(Q; x):P : 
; x : (;)   `P P :   `L  : Loc(R;D;I) `Q Q : (;)   h;;i 2 D
bPdc
 `P del(Q; x):P : 
 `L  : Loc(R;D;I)  `P P :    `E e :      (;) 2 I
bPic
 `P ins(;e):P : 
bP0c
 `P 0 : 
bPvc
 `P X : 
 `P P : 
bPrc
 `P recX:P : 
 `P P0 :   `P P1 : 
bP+c
 `P P0 + P1 : 
;a: Loc(R;D;I) `P P : 
bP9c
 `P 9a: Loc(R;D;I):P : 
Figure 12: Typing Rules for Processes
bS0c
`S 0
`D D :
bSdc
`S D
`P P : 
bSc
`S [P]
`S S `S S 0
bSjjc
`S S jj S 0
Figure 13: Typing Rules for Systems
Consider the ﬁrst scenario in Sec. 4.5. There are three agents interacting with
data in a location. Assume that the location Toyama has the insert pair hHorne;i
and the access triple hDezani;Horne;>i for deleting. Also assume that the location
Toyama City has the insert pair hDezani;>i. These assumptions allow the system to be
typed. The agent Horne can write any fresh data to the location and the agent Dezani
can remove any data contributed by Horne. However without the insert pair hHorne;i,
the system is not well typed, so the agent Horne could not have inserted the misleading
triple.
Consider the second scenario in Sec. 4.5. Assume that the location Toyama has
access triple h; ;>i for deleting. Then the agent  is well typed. Notice that the
annotation on the select quantiﬁer is sucient to guarantee that the location discovered
by the query is of the correct type to enable the insert to be triggered. Thus assuming
that the location rkpres:CS132820 has the insert pair h;>  (ACM; )i, the system
will reduce since the dynamic check in the reduction rule enforces that the location
discovered matches the annotation. Thus the static typing relies on the dynamic type
check for that location.
Consider the scenario in Sec. 4.6. Assume that the locations acm 1 and cs 1
have the access triple hRKBexplorer; ;>i for getting, and that the location Toyama
has the insert pair hRKBexplorer;( ;cs 1)  > _ ( ;acm 1)  >i and the access triple
hSassone;RKBexplorer;>i for getting. Then both agents are well typed. For agent
Sassone the dynamic checks in the reduction rules assure that the discovered locations
indeed allow Sassone to read, as indicated by the annotations.
176. Properties
This section veriﬁes that the type system is correctly deﬁned. An essential subject
reduction theorem veriﬁes that typing can be statically checked. Finally, it is proven
that the location policies are indeed enforced for well-typed systems.
This section starts as usual with inversion lemmas whose proofs are standard.
Lemma 6.1 (Inversion Lemma for Data). 1. If `D Cp : , then wf(p) and p  .
2. If `D D0 jj D1 : , then `D D0 :  and `D D1 : .
Lemma 6.2 (Inversion Lemma for Queries). 1. If `Q C : 0, then   0.
2. If `Q Q0  Q1 : , then `Q Q0 :  and `Q Q1 : .
3. If `Q Q0 
 Q1 : , then `Q Q0 :  and `Q Q1 : .
4. If `Q 9a:Q : , then `Q Q : .
5. If `Q Q : , then `Q Q : .
Lemma 6.3 (Inversion Lemma for Expressions). 1. If   `E x : , then   =  0; x :
0 and 0  .
2. If   `E D : , then `D D : .
3. If   `E f(e) : , then   `E e : 0 and f#  0 _ 0  .
4. If   `E e0 jj e1 : , then   `E e0 :  and   `E e1 : .
Lemma 6.4 (Inversion Lemma for Processes). 1. If  `P get(Q; x):P : , then
; x : (;)   `P P :  and  `L  : Loc(R;D;I) and `Q Q : (;)   and
h;;i 2 R.
2. If  `P del(Q; x):P : , then ; x : (;) `P P :  and  `L  : Loc(R;D;I)
and `Q Q : (;)   and h;;i 2 D.
3. If  `P ins(;e):P : , then  `L  : Loc(R;D;I) and  `P P :  and
  `E e :  and     and h;i 2 I.
4. If  `P P0 + P1 : , then  `P P0 :  and  `P P1 : .
5. If  `P recX:P : , then  `P P : .
6. If  `P 9a: Loc(R;D;I):P : , then ;a: Loc(R;D;I) `P P : .
Lemma 6.5 (Inversion Lemma for Systems). 1. If `S D, then `D D : .
2. If `S [P], then `P P : .
3. If `S S jj S 0, then `S S and `S S 0.
18The proof of subject reduction (Theorem 6.8) is based on the agreement between
the typing of stored data and the pre-order on patterns, the satisfaction of queries and
the reduction of expressions, as formalised in the following Lemma.
Lemma 6.6 (Key). 1. If `D D :  and   0, then `D D : 0.
2. If `Q Q :  and D j= Q and `S D, then `D D : .
3. If `E e :  and e + D, then `D D : .
Proof. (1). By induction on the deﬁnition of `D using Proposition 4.1 for rule bDtc.
(2). By induction on the deﬁnition of j=.
p  0
Cp j= C0
By Lemma 6.2(1) `Q C0
:  implies 0  . Proposition 4.1 and p  0 give p  .
By Lemmas 6.5(1) and 6.1(1) `S Cp implies wf(p). So `D Cp :  can be derived using
rule bDtc.
D j= Q0
D j= Q0  Q1
By Lemma 6.2(2) `Q Q0  Q1 :  implies `Q Q0 :  and `Q Q1 : . The induction
applied to `Q Q0 :  and D j= Q0 gives `D D : .
D0 j= Q0 D1 j= Q1
D0 jj D1 j= Q0 
 Q1
By Lemma 6.2(3) `Q Q0 
 Q1 :  implies `Q Q0 :  and `Q Q1 : . Induction gives
`D D0 :  and `D D1 :  and then `D D0 jj D1 :  can be derived using rule bDjjc.
The remaining cases are similar and simpler.
(3). By induction on +. The only interesting case is
jfj(m
i=1Ci) # n
j=1 ˆ Cj q = f# 
m _
i=1
pi
f(m
i=1C
pi
i jj D) + n
j=1 ˆ C
q
j jj D
By Lemma 6.3(3) `E f(m
i=1C
pi
i jj D) :  implies `E m
i=1C
pi
i jj D : 0 and f#0_0  .
Lemmas 6.3(2) ans 6.1(2) give `D C
pi
i : 0 for all i (1  i  m) and `D D : 0. Lemma
6.1(1) implies wf(pi) and pi  0 for all i (1  i  m), which allow to derive wf(q) and Wm
i=1 pi  0 and then q  f#0 and lastly q  . Lastly `D ˆ C
q
j :  for all j (1  j  n)
using rule bDtc. Point (1) gives `D D :  and we conclude `D n
j=1 ˆ C
q
j jj D :  can be
derived using rule bDjjc. 
The following substitution lemma has a simple proof since data variables in pro-
cesses can only occur inside expressions.
Lemma 6.7 (Substitution Lemma). If ; x :  ` P :  and ` D : , then  ` PfD=xg : .
19The preservation of typing under reduction can now be shown.
Theorem 6.8 (Subject Reduction). If `S S and S  ! S 0, then `S S 0.
Proof. By induction on  !.
D j= Q
[get(Q; x):P] jj D  ! 
h
PfD=xg
i
jj D
By Lemma 6.5(3) `S [get(Q; x):P] jj D implies `S [get(Q; x):P] and `S D. By
Lemma 6.5(2) `S [get(Q; x):P] implies `P get(Q; x):P : . Then x : (;`)   `P
P :  and `L ` : Loc(R;D;I) and `Q Q : (;`)   and h;;i 2 R by Lemma 6.4(1).
By Lemma 6.6(2) `D D : (;`)   which implies `P PfD=xg :  by Lemma 6.7. Lastly
`S 
h
PfD=xg
i
jj D can be derived using rules bSc, bSdc and bSjjc.
e + m
i=1C
pi
i
[ins(`;e):P]  ! [P] jj m
i=1C
(;`)pi
i
ByLemma6.5(2)`S [ins(l;e):P]implies`P ins(l;e):P : . Then`L ` : Loc(R;D;I)
and `P P :  and `E e :  and (;) 2 I by Lemma 6.4(3). By Lemma 6.6(3)
`D m
i=1C
pi
i : . This implies wf(pi) and pi   for all i (1  i  m) by Lemma
6.1(2) and (1). wf(pi), `L ` : Loc(R;D;I) and (;) 2 I give wf((;`)  pi). Then
`S C
(;`)pi
i for all i (1  i  m) can be derived using rules bDtc and bSdc. Lastly
`S [P] jj m
i=1C
(;`)pi
i can be derived using rules bSc and bSjjc.

This section ends by showing that reducing a well-typed system:
1. If an agent  gets a tracked triple C(;`)p, then the getting policy of ` contains the
triple h;; pi.
2. If an agent  deletes a tracked tripleC(;`)p, then the deleting policy of ` contains
the triple h;; pi.
3. If an agent  inserts a tracked triple Cp, then the inserting policy of ` contains
the pair h; pi.
More precisely the following theorem holds:
Theorem 6.9. 1. If`S [get(Q; x):P]andC(;`)p jj D j= Q, then`L ` : Loc(R;D;I)
and h;; pi 2 R.
2. If `S [del(Q; x):P] and C(;`)p jj D j= Q, then `L ` : Loc(R;D;I) and
h;; pi 2 D.
3. If `S [ins(`;e):P] and e + Cp jj D, then `L ` : Loc(R;D;I) and h; pi 2 I.
20Proof. (1). By Lemmas 6.5(2) and 6.4(1) `S [get(Q; x):P] implies x : (;`0)   `P
P :  and `L `0 : Loc(R;D;I) and `Q Q : (;`0)   and h;;i 2 R. C(;`)p jj D  Q
and `Q Q : (;`0)   give `D C(;`)p : (;`0)   by Lemmas 6.6(2) and 6.1(2). This
gives (;`) p  (;`0) by Lemma 6.1(1), which implies   , ` = `0 and p   by
Proposition 4.1 and deﬁnition of . Lastly Loc(R;D;I)  Loc(R [ fh;; pig;D;I)
and then `L ` : Loc(R [ fh;; pig;D;I) can be derived using rule bL`c.
(2). Similar to the proof of (1).
(3). By Lemmas 6.5(2) and 6.4(3) `S [ins(`;e):P] implies `L ` : Loc(R;D;I) and
`P P :  and `E e :  and h;i 2 I. By Lemmas 6.6(3) and 6.1(2) e + Cp jj D and `E
e :  imply `D Cp : . This gives p   by Lemma 6.1(1) and p   by Proposition 4.1.
Lastly Loc(R;D;I)  Loc(R;D;I [ fh; pig) and then `L ` : Loc(R;D;I [ fh; pig)
can be derived using rule bL`c. 
Thus a well-typed system reduces by respecting the access control dictated by the
location policies.
7. Related Work
The Web of Linked Data, or simply ‘Linked Data’ [49], which draws experience
from ideas explored for the ‘Semantic Web,’ is a composite and exciting movement of
ideas, applications and techniques arising the Web as we know it. It originates from the
desire of moving away from a web of documents to a web of data. This is a web where
links are not simply a technical device to reach documents, but rather a way to attach
meaning to data and establish semantic connections between pieces of information.
Its characterising features include the use of dereferenceable URIs to represent atomic
information and RDF to represent their relationships [3].
SofartheLinkedDatacommunityhaschieﬂyfocussedonpublishinglargedatasets,
importing them from various sources to RDF, and on designing applications which
make use of such data in tools of popular impact. Most of the theoretical work has
been devoted to developing ontologies and their formulation using description log-
ics [32]. An equally considerable eort has been dedicated to the study of the Web as
a science [4], including (social) network dynamics (cf. e.g. [1]).
Ours is among the ﬁrst papers to propose a language-based semantics for Linked
Data. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst formal operation model of (com-
putation over) Linked Data is [28], followed by [31] and [30, 29]. Our calculus here is
original in its all provenance elements, but bears a close resemblance to that of [28] for
its linked data part. An alternative formal model of dereferencing URIs in linked data
is provided by Jerey and Patel-Schneider [33].
As a research theme, provenance covers a very wide spectrum of problems, tech-
niques and approaches. With a recent ﬂourishing of activity, and most of its literature
published in the last four years, it is a ﬁeld in ﬂux, rather complex to review system-
atically. A comprehensive survey and full literature analysis is therefore beyond our
present scope, and can be found e.g. in [39]. Here only the main components of the
provenance movement are mentioned, as well as those items of work more directly
related to the present paper.
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where the need arose to characterise the source of information [53] so as to justify the
answer to complex queries [9]. In that context, provenance developed an elegant math-
ematical theory, which is arguably the pinnacle of its theoretical development, where
symbolic polynomials on semi-rings are used to represent abstractly computations and
their sources (cf., e.g., [23]).
The research on provenance moved out of its databases origins to ﬁnd wider and
deeper applications in workﬂow systems for eScience and for web computing (cf. [50]
for a survey). This represented a signiﬁcant extension in scope, which brought to a
consolidation of ideas and a generalisation of techniques, as well as the design of pilot
systems and infrastructures, including Kepler [6], VDL [16], Taverna [55] and PA-
SOA [24], and the formulation of the concept of ‘provenance-aware’ application [38].
In particular, provenance became a concept in distributed computing, where it devel-
oped a need for standardisation [40] and interchange of data [41] and processes [35].
Among other trends, provenance recently acquired a trust and security dimension (cf.
[2]), which is relevant to this work.
According to its most liberal deﬁnition, the provenance of a piece of data is the
process that led to that piece of data. A concrete approach to this notion represents
provenance via direct acyclic graphs, where nodes are data and edges are data deriva-
tions [37, 40]. Our work is compatible with such model, yet we use trees and leave the
generalisation to graphs to future work. The ‘why-’ ‘where-’ and ‘how-provenance’
notions from databases [53, 17, 9] are also well represented in our calculus. An al-
ternative approach which focusses on the use of user-provided metadata to record the
provenance information is the ‘provenance-as-annotations’ paradigm [46].
The present work is more closely related to the application to provenance of formal
methods and analysis techniques. Buneman et al in [8] study the expressive power
of provenance in database queries, Cheney et al [13, 12] introduce a formal notion of
provenance traces and study some of its properties, including computability, consis-
tency and ﬁdelity issues. A formal account of the interchange provenance data model
of [40] has been given in [37]. A precursor to this paper is [51], where Sassone and
Souilah present a -calculus where the provenance channel communication is traced.
As here, the provenance model is a tree, whilst the data model only includes names like
in the  calculus.
Provenance for Linked Data has already been considered in the literature. A ﬁrst
line of work is concerned with representing provenance using RDF and to query and
reason over provenance using Linked Data techniques (see, e.g., [54]). Closer to our
interests, Carroll et al [10] introduced named graphs as a ﬁrst approach to where prove-
nance for RDF triples. Our work extends named graphs is several signiﬁcant ways.
Whilst we are aware of no further formal work on provenance for linked data, we re-
mark that the algebraic axiomatisation of SPARQL queries in [30] provides a starting
point for our future investigation of provenance semirings for our calculus.
A signiﬁcant amount of work has concerned provenance and security. One strand
deals with securing access to provenance information (cf., e.g., [42, 7]). Chong [15]
presents a formal system to control undesired indirect disclosure of provenance trace.
Rosenthal et al [48] introduce ‘attribute-based access control’ to specify policies of
access control to provenance, whilst [11, 43] focus on conﬁdentiality of provenance
22by controlling respectively ‘user view’ and queries. A dierent research line treats of
integrity [26, 19, 34] and non-repudiability [20] of provenance traces. Golbeck [21]
exploits provenance to implement trust-based ﬁltering of web content, whilst Vaughan
et al [52] use evidence-based audits for language-based security. We believe our calcu-
lus provides a powerful and ﬂexible framework to investigate questions such as these,
which is proposed as future work. The reader is remanded to [47] for further informa-
tion about open problems and current provenance research.
8. Conclusion
The provenance format introduced in the work is clean and simple. It is however
a signiﬁcant extension of existing provenance formats for Linked Data. It provides a
comprehensive account of where and who provenance, and records all agents who have
published the data and where the data was written. In line with existing approaches to
provenance for Linked Data, the provenance is recorded at the level of triples (rather
than URIs).
Our examples use Linked Data published on the Web at the time of writing. They
represent realistic scenarios, and are provided to explain how the demands of the appli-
cation are addressed. The examples beneﬁt from the formal syntax and the operational
semantics of the calculus they are expressed in, and this enables an unambiguous dis-
cussion of the ideas explored.
The calculus presents some fresh ideas for new high level languages for Linked
Data. Some high level constructs are suggested which combine explicit dereferencing
ofURIswithqueriesoverthedataobtainedandthecontinuationprocesswhichusesthe
data. Furthermore, the queries are extended with patterns which exploit provenance,
and demonstrate that the ideas in this paper can be usefully integrated with several ex-
isting languages. The framework for operational semantics employed is concise and
extensible. Thus further features for tackling problems in Linked Data [27] can be
combined with this work easily. Some basic how provenance is suggested by means of
functions. By recording the functions applied to data in the provenance format, judge-
ments can be made about the quality of data depending on whether reliable functions
were applied. More detailed why provenance could be recorded by indicating a proof
of why some data is transformed into some other data.
The calculus provides a credible and ﬂexible framework for future developments,
some of which we indicated in the previous section. Among the several avenues for
future work, we anticipate ﬁve priority directions. Firstly, a calculus of transformations
over Linked Data should be speciﬁed to provide a detailed account of why provenance.
Also, we expect to extend our provenance traces to direct acyclic graphs. This entails
formulating a suitable syntax for graphs as well as a treatable logic for querying them.
Security ﬁgures among the most interesting challenges for both linked data and prove-
nance. We propose to focus on controlling the access to provenance information. This
will involve equipping our calculus with mechanisms and primitives to specify suitable
access control policies, as well as the analysis of how information may covertly ﬂow
from (public) provenance trees to (private) data. Finally, we propose to use our calcu-
lus as a formal platform to develop trust-based assessment and ﬁltering on the Web of
Linked Data.
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